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COMMENTS
STRICT LIABILITY OF THE BAILOR, LESSOR AND
LICENSOR
The fall of a citadel is a dramatic moment. The stronghold has
long been invested; the siege has endured for months. Parallels
have been dug and gun emplacements mounted; and a grim can-
nonade has made breaches in the great wall, behind which the
defenders have erected demilunes, so that the struggle goes on.
There is a final heavy bombardment; the assault goes forward
against the main breach, and the storming party ascends over the
corpses of the slain. There is a desperate hour of hand-to-hand
combat, and then the moment when the defense falters. The line
wavers; the break becomes a retreat, the retreat a rout. The rest
is the story of sack and slaughter, of riot, rape and rapine. . .I
William L. Prosser
INTRODUCTION
In 1965, the American Law Institute approved and adopted
Sec. 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts,2 which purported
to express the liability of a seller of defective products to injured
users or consumers in tort, independent of warranty considera-
tions. The draftsmen of Sec. 402A were of the opinion that much
of the confusion spawned by the application of warranty doctrine
to products liability litigation would be alleviated by a forthright
definition of the liability of sellers of products which sounded in
tort and obviated any necessity of determining the significance of
the traditional warranty defenses of privity, disclaimer and notice
of breach.' To a certain extent, their belief has proven correct. The
1. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966).
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, COMMENT (in) at 355-56 (1965).
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liability of sellers of defective products to injured users or consum-
ers of such products is better stated as a matter of tort law than
as an unstable hybrid of contract law and traditional negligence
principles.4 However, the formulation of the doctrine of strict lia-
bility in tort has not cured all the problems involved in the field of
products liability. One of the most recurrent and significant prob-
lems confronting the courts today involves the definition of the
class subject to the imposition of strict liability under Sec. 402A.
At this juncture in time, it appears that the reference to "sellers"
in Sec. 402A should not be considered a designation of limitation,
excluding all those individuals not engaged in the sale of products. 5
It has yet to be determined, though, precisely what parameters
should govern the application of strict liability. It is the purpose
of this paper to explore the extent to which strict liability has been
imposed on bailors, lessors and licensors. In so doing, hopefully,
the ultimate limits of strict liability will be glimpsed.
As a necessary first step in the analysis of bailor-lessor-licensor
strict liability, some consideration shall be paid to the Restatement
provisions pertinent thereto. Sec. 402A presumes to define the
liability of the seller of a product for physical harm to the user or
consumer of the product. As a precondition to the imposition of
liability under this section, it must first be established that the
product sold was in a defective condition, unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer, that it was expected to and did reach the
user or consumer in substantially the same condition in which it
was sold and, finally, that the seller was engaged in the business
of selling such a product.' The rule specifically provides that strict
liability will apply even though the seller has exercised all possible
caution in the manufacture or preparation and sale of the product
and even in the absence of privity between the injured user or
consumer and the seller. 7
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, COMMENT (m) at 355 (1965); Prosser,
The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966).
5. Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., 101 Cal. Rptr. 314 (Cal. App. 1972); Stang v. Hertz
Corp., 497 P.2d 732 (N.M. 1972); Lechuga, Inc. v. Montgomery, 12 Ariz. App. 32, 467
P.2d 256 (1970).
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, COMMENT (c) at 349-50 (1965) provides
an expression of the fundamental justification for strict liability, ascribing the imposition
of liability under the delineated circumstances to the fact that:
. . . the seller, by marketing his product for use and consumption, has undertaken
and assumed a special responsibility toward any member of the consuming public
who may be injured by it; that the public has the right to and does expect, in the
case of products which it needs and for which it is forced to rely upon the seller, that
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Reading the rule as it is written, it appears that one of the most
significant requirements postulated, if the literal sense of the sec-
tion is accorded highest priority, is the necessity for a sales transac-
tion in which ownership of the product alleged to have been defec-
tive and to have caused some injury to a user or consumer, has
passed from a "seller" to a "user" or "consumer." If this particu-
lar requirement is given the ultimate determinative value and the
term is interpreted as a designation of limitation to a peculiar, well-
defined class as opposed to a designation of simple generic signifi-
cance, the question of bailor-lessor-licensor strict liability can be
quickly answered in the negative. However, if this requirement of
a sale is loosely interpreted as referring to the event by which a
particular product is injected into the stream of commerce (without
attaching dispositive importance to the form of the event), the
result in application will undoubtedly be different.
The comments to See. 402A offer precious little guidance in
this matter of interpreting the scope of the term "seller" for pur-
poses of determining the applicability of Sec. 402A. Comment (f)
provides that the rule should be regarded as bearing on "any per-
son engaged in the business of selling products for use or consump-
tion," including product manufacturers, wholesale or retail dealers
or distributors and restaurant operators." It further provides that
the rule encompasses only those engaged in selling activity. The
rule does not apply, however, to the ordinary individual who makes
the isolated sale and the occasional seller of food who is not en-
gaged in that particular activity as a normal incident of his busi-
ness? It is also clear that the rule does not apply to "sales of the
stock of merchants out of the usual course of business, such as
execution sales, bankruptcy sales, bulk sales, and the like."" ° In
view of the particular delineation of those individuals in the distrib-
utive scheme to whom strict liability is applicable according to
Comment (f) and the specific exemptions to the operation of the
rule contained therein, all of which invariably involve some kind
reputable sellers will stand behind their goods; that public policy demands that the
burden of accidental injuries caused by products intended for consumption be placed
upon those who market them and be treated as a cost of production against which
liability insurance can be obtained; and that the consumer of such products is entitled
to the maximum of protection at the hands of someone, and the proper persons to
afford it are those who market the products.
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, COMMENT (k) at 353-54 (1965).
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, COMMENT (f) at 350 (1965).
9. Id. at 350-51.
10. Id. at 350-51.
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of technical sales transaction, it might be inferred that the category
of "sellers" is not subject to expansion beyond its common sense
scope. As a necessary consequence, the liability stated in Secs. 388,
407, and 408," pertaining to the provision of a chattel known to
be dangerous for intended use and applicable to any supplier of the
chattel (defined to include sellers, lessors, donors, lenders, bailors
of all kinds and service personnel) to the extent of anyone whom
the supplier should expect to use the chattel (including those who
might be expected to use the chattel with permission of the person
to whom the chattel is supplied) must be regarded as exclusive.
Indeed, several courts have determined that this is the only conclu-
sion that can be drawn from the absence of any reference to anyone
other than sellers in Sec. 402A.12 This is only one of two permissi-
ble inferences, however.
It might also be argued that Sec. 402A was not intended to be
restricted in application to those individuals injecting products into
the stream of commerce through a technical sale of such products
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965).
Chattel Known to be Dangerous for Intended Use
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another to use
is subject to liability to those whom the supplier should expect to use the chattel with
the consent of the other or to be endangered by its probable use, for physical harm
caused by the use of the chattel in the manner for which and by a person for whose
use it is supplied, if the supplier
(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous
for the use for which it is supplied, and
(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is supplied will
realize its dangerous condition, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condition
or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 407 (1965).
Lessors of Chattels Known to be Dangerous
A lessor who leases a chattel for the use of others, knowing or having reason to
know that it is or is likely to be dangerous for the purpose for which it is to be used,
is subject to liability as a supplier of the chattel.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 408 (1965).
Lease of Chattel for Immediate Use
One who leases a chattel as safe for immediate use is subject to liability to those
whom he should expect to use the chattel, or to be endangered by its probable use,
for physical harm caused by its use in a manner for which, and by a person for whose
use, it is leased, if the lessor fails to exercise reasonable care to make it safe for such
use or to disclose its actual condition to those who may be expected to use it.
12. See Stang v. Hertz Corp., 497 P.2d 732 (N.M. 1972). Cf Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83
N.M. 217, 490 P.2d 475 (1971), applying §§ 407 and 408 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS (1965) to commercial lease transactions. See also Speyer, Inc. v. Humble Oil &
Refining Co., 403 F.2d 766 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1015 (1969); Bona v.
Graefe, 264 Md. 69, 285 A.2d 607 (1972); Freitas v. Twin City Fisherman's Cooperative,
452 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
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since the rule does not specifically so provide. Moreover, it can be
asserted with some confidence that the draftsmen of Sec. 402A
intended the term "seller" to be interpreted liberally, consistent
with the evolution of business practices, since Comment (c) defines
the term "seller" as one who markets his product for use and
consumption.13 The sense of such reference indicates that all those
individuals having a significant function in the marketing enter-
prise of a given product were meant to be encompassed by the term
"seller." This interpretation is even more credible when one con-
siders that, by the express language of Sec. 402A, strict liability
applies although the user or consumer has not bought the product
or entered into any contractual relation regarding the product,
indicative of an intent that the mere circumstance of a technical
sales transaction will not be conclusive. 4
An even more compelling argument for the proposition that the
term "seller" should be accorded generic significance is suggested
by analogy to the law of warranty. It has long been recognized that
the policies governing the law of warranties are not limited to
technical sales transactions. Thus, it has frequently been held that
the existence of a bailment or a lease instead of a sale would not
preclude a plaintiff from recovering against the bailor or lessor
under a theory of implied warranty. 15 The draftsmen of the Uni-
form Commercial Code have similarly recognized that recovery on
warranty need not be limited to instances of sales transactions. 6
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, COMMENT (c) at 349 (1965).
14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
15. Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Service, 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769
(1965); Delaney v. Towmotor Corp., 339 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1964); Booth Steamship Co. v.
Meier & Oelhef Co., 262 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1958); Gambino v. John Lucas & Co., 263 App.
Div. 1054, 34 N.Y.S.2d 383 (App. Div. 1942); Yarbrough v. Ball U-Drive System (Fla.
1950) 48 So. 2d 82; Donner v. Morse Auto Rentals, Inc., 147 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1963);
Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319 (Alaska 1970); Gray Line Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 280 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1960); W.E. Johnson Equipment Co. v. United Airlines, 238
So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1970); Bengiat v. State of New York, 256 N.Y.S.2d 876 (Ct. of Cl. N.Y.
1965); Baker v. Seattle, 79 Wash. 2d 198, 484 P.2d 405 (1971); Tombs v. Fort Pierce Gas
Co., 208 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 1968); See also 63 AM. JUR. 2d Products Liability § 6 (1972)
wherein the rule as to the applicability of warranty doctrine to non-sales transactions is
expressed as:
• . . the general rule is that the bailor impliedly warrants the reasonable suitability
of the bailed chattel for the bailee's known intended use of it. To a certain degree,
the rule applies even where the bailment is not one for hire. . . . In particular, where
there is a bailment for hire. . . the bailment is circumscribed by an implied warranty
that the rented article is fit for the purpose for which it is intended . ...
Cf. 8 AM. JUR. 2d Bailments § 146 (1972). See also Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of
Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 653 (1957); CCH PROD. LIAB. REP. 1186
at 1052 (1970).
16. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313, Comment 2:
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Furthermore, the recommendation of the Code draftsmen has
just recently received judicial approval. In W. E. Johnson Equip-
ment Co. v. United Airlines, Inc., 7 the Florida Supreme Court
extended Sec. 2-315 of the UCC to lease transactions, holding that
in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, where the lessor
has reason to know any particular purpose for which the leased
chattel is required and that the lessee is relying on the skill and
judgment of the lessor to select or furnish a suitable chattel, there
is an implied warranty that the chattel is fit for that purpose.
Recognizing that it was establishing a precedent in the products
liability area, the court outlined the reasons for imposing a war-
ranty of fitness and described the "appropriate circumstances"
demanding application. The court examined the essential purposes
and the policy involved in applying warranties to protect the con-
sumer in sales transactions and concluded by analogy that the
same justification was present in a lease situation.
The risk of harm from a defective product exists in lease situa-
tions as well as sales. The person leasing a product is in equal need,
and has an equal right to, protection from an unreasonable risk of
harm. The lessee, like the buyer, is relying on the skill and judg-
ment of the lessor to provide a safe product. Finally, the commer-
cial lessor, primarily or substantially involved in leasing goods, is
in the best position to bear and distribute the loss resulting from
injury caused by a defective product. He is also in a position to
know and control the conditions of the chattel as well as protect
against loss through insurance.
In further recognition of the contemporary expansion in leasing
enterprises and the concomitant need for consumer protection, the
Washington Supreme Court imposed a warranty of fitness in a
case involving the lease of an electric golf cart from the city." The
court cited W.E. Johnson Equipment Co. v. United Airlines, Inc.,19
Although this section is limited in scope and direct purpose to warranties made by
the seller to the buyer as part of a contract for sale, the warranty sections of this
Article are not designed in any way to disturb those lines of case law growth which
have recognized that warranties need not be confined either to sales contracts or to
the direct parties to such a contract. They may arise in other appropriate circumstan-
ces such as in the case of bailments for hire ....
See also UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-102. The scope of article 2 of the Code is
defined in terms of "transactions in goods," a clear indication that article 2 was not intended
to be limited to sales; 2 HARPER AND JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 28.19 (1956):
• . . development of the warranty doctrine in sales should point the way by sugges-
tive analogy to similar results in cases where a commodity is leased. ...
17. 238 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1970).
18. Baker v. Seattle, 484 P.2d 405 (Wash. 1971).
19. 238 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1970).
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as authority for the extension of UCC Sales Article policy to lease
transactions and reaffirmed the Johnson court's conclusion that
commercial lessors should be responsible to the same extent as
sellers. 21
If the doctrinal relationship between strict liability and implied
warranty of merchantibility and fitness is anywhere near as strong
as has been suggested, 21 certainly the development of warranty law
should stand as precedent for a construction of strict liability which
would have application beyond the narrow confines of the sales
transaction. In any event, the evolution of the warranty doctrine
to the point where it embraces the many and varied forms of
business enterprise and organization, including but not limited to
the lease and bailment transactions, militates in favor of according
the term "seller" in Sec. 402A a broad significance.
In the final analysis, however, it is highly *questionable whether
one can deduce the propriety of considering the term "seller" as
either a designation of strict limitation or a reference to a generic
class solely from an inspection of the express terms of Sec. 402A
or the comments thereto. It is even more questionable whether one
should. The scope and extent of strict liability has been considered
by numerous courts in its short life and the most accurate determi-
nation of the applicability of strict liability to the bailor-bailee,
lessor-lessee and licensor-licensee relationships can be gained by
examining these decisions. With this in mind, the following discus-
sion will focus on the judicial application of strict liability to bai-
lors, lessors and licensors, respectively, with some consideration
given over to the future development of strict liability in these
areas.
LIABILITY OF BAILORS UNDER SEC. 402A
It must be noted at the outset that strict liability does not
apply to the gratuitous bailor, who is not engaged in the business
of bailment, nor does it apply to the isolated bailment situation,
even though the bailment may be supported by a consideration. 2
The gratuitous bailor ordinarily does not fall within the ambit of
the limitation on liability ordained by Sec. 402A pertaining to
20. See also Jones v. Keetch, 200 N.W.2d 227 (Mich. 1972).
21. Titus, Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A and the Uniform Commercial
Code, 22 STAN. L. REv. 713 (1970).
22. Speyer, Inc. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 403 F.2d 766 (3d Cir. 1968); Conroy
v. 10 Brewster Ave. Corp., 97 N.J. Super. 75, 234 A.2d 415 (1967); Katz v. Slade, 460
S.W.2d 608 (Mo. 1970); 8 C.J.S. Bailments § 22 (1972); 63 AM. JUR. 2d Products Liability
§ 6 (1972). But see Fakhoury v. Magner, 25 Cal. App. 3d 58, 101 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1972).
19731
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
"sellers engaged in the business of selling [a] product."23 Inas-
much as the gratuitous bailment is typically an isolated transac-
tion, involving a rather casual, short-term transfer of possession by
a person not in the bailment business, the gratuitous bailor does
not fit the description of the individual to which strict liability was
intended to apply. Nor is there any reason to impose strict liability
on the gratuitous bailor for injuries resulting from the defective
condition of the bailed article. Comment (f) to Sec. 402A of the
Restatement recognized the basis of the rule of strict liability to
be:
the special responsibility for the safety of the public undertaken
by one who enters into the business of supplying human beings
with products which may endanger the safety of their persons and
property, and the forced reliance upon that undertaking on the
part of those who purchase such goods.24
Obviously, the justification for strict liability is lacking in the case
of an individual who has not entered into the business of supplying
the public with products and who has not created any reliance in
the public on the quality of his goods.
Similarly, the non-gratuitous occasional bailment is also with-
out the scope of the class to which strict liability applies. In this
connection, the reasons for exempting isolated sales transactions
from the sanction of strict liability are apposite. It cannot be said
that the occasional bailor has undertaken and assumed a special
responsibility toward the consuming public. In sum, it must be
recognized that the occasional bailor has done nothing to incur any
duty toward the consuming public beyond that imposed under tra-
ditional negligence principles. It should be borne in mind, however,
that a seller of products, engaged in the business of selling, will not
be absolved from strict liability for injuries resulting from a defec-
tive product, suffered by a user or consumer of such product,
simply because the transaction by which the product reached the
user or consumer can be characterized as a bailment, incidental to
the seller's primary business of selling and preliminarily classifia-
ble as occasional. 25
The considerations urged in discussion of the rules surrounding
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
24. Id. at 351.
25. Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1968);
Perfection Paint & Color Co. v. Konduris, 258 N.E.2d 681 (App. Ct. Ind. 1970). But see
Speyer, Inc. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 403 F.2d 766 (3d Cir. 1968); Freitas v. Twin
City Fisherman's Cooperative Assn., 452 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
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the occasional bailment, where such bailment is made for a consid-
eration, nominal or otherwise, are also applicable to the occasional
lease transaction. The rules pertaining to the occasional bailment
or lease transaction can best be illustrated by reference to several
concrete factual situations.
In Speyer, Inc. v. Humble Oil and Refining Co.,2" a gasoline
supplier, at whose direction a service contractor installed a flex-
steel hose on a gas pump, leased by the supplier to the plaintiff,
was held not to be a "seller" of the pump for purposes of imposing
strict liability under Sec. 402A. In April of 1954, an Erie Meter
Systems gasoline pump was installed in the garage of plaintiff,
Yellow Cab Co., by Cemico, the gasoline supplier of Yellow Cab
at the time. Yellow Cab changed its supplier from Cemico to
Humble in 1955 and purchased Cemico's pump. In performance
of a condition imposed by Yellow Cab for obtaining the supply
contract, Humble Oil then purchased the pump and leased it back
to Yellow Cab for free. In 1963, a service contractor of Yellow Cab
installed a new type, heavy-duty flexsteel hose on the pump.
Through misuse of the flexsteel hose by Yellow Cab employees, a
leakage of gasoline from the pump occurred. The spilled gasoline
erupted into flames and destroyed plaintiff-Speyer's garage and
sixty-five taxicabs owned by Yellow Cab. A suit to recover the fire
damage was instituted against Humble Oil, the gasoline supplier
and lessor of the allegedly defective pump. The trial court rendered
judgment for the defendant. Plaintiffs, Speyer and Yellow Cab,
appealed, contending that liability might be imposed on the defen-
dant under the theory of strict liability. The court of appeals re-
jected plaintiffs' contention, ruling that Humble Oil was not a
seller engaged in the business of selling within the purview of Sec.
402A and thus could not be held strictly liable. The court of
appeals based its decision on the isolated character of the transac-
tion involved, viewing it as merely incidental to Humble's primary
business of gasoline supply. While the case has been cited for the
proposition that a lessor may not be held strictly liable under any
circumstances for injuries resulting from the lease of a defective
product, the more reasonable view attributes the holding to a find-
ing that the defendant was not in the business of leasing gas pumps,
considering the type of lease-back arrangement involved in the
case.
A more typical illustration of the inapplicability of strict liabil-
ity to the isolated lease transaction is furnished by Conroy v. 10
26. 403 F.2d 766 (3d Cir. 1968).
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Brewster Ave. Corp.7 In this case, the Superior Court of New
Jersey refused to hold a landlord strictly liable for injuries sus-
tained by the seven year old child of the landlord's tenants. The
child had been playing in the basement area of the rented house
with another one of the tenants' children and had reached into a
basement tub to retrieve an errant ball. As the child reached, his
arm grazed the hot water faucet on the tub, causing hot water to
gush out of the faucet nozzle and splash over his arm and upper
body. The child received a severe scalding over that portion of his
body exposed to the water. On subsequent inspection of the faucet
mechanism, it was discovered that the apostat, which controlled
the temperature of the hot water supplied to the basement tub, was
defective in that it was set to maintain the temperature of the water
at 240'. The court held that strict liability as it pertains to the
lessor-lessee situation applies only to the mass lessor and not to the
kind of individual involved in this case. Once again, the court
seemed particularly impressed with the isolated character of the
lease transaction. 28
At this juncture, it must be conceded that the isolated bailment
or lease transaction is beyond the pale of strict liability, regardless
of whether that transaction be gratuitous or quasi-commercial in
nature. The same is not true in the case of the large-scale bailor-
for-hire or the commercial lessor. The following discussion will
focus on the case law application of strict liability to the commer-
cial bailment or lease transaction. Because the cases do not make
any critical distinction between the commercial lessor and the
bailor-for-hire when treating this issue, the terms are hereafter
used synonymously. For purposes of organization, the cases will
be considered under the heading of lessor.
COMMERCIAL LESSOR LIABILITY UNDER SEC. 402A
The landmark case on the subject of commercial lessor liabil-
ity under Sec. 402A arose in 1965. In Cintrone v. Hertz Truck
Leasing and Rental Service,29 the New Jersey Supreme Court es-
tablished a precedent in the field of strict products liability by
ruling that the liability of a bailor-for-hire might properly be stated
in terms of strict liability in tort. The defendant in Cintrone was
actively engaged in the U-drive-it business as a truck leasing firm.
An employee of the lessee of one of defendant's trucks was injured
27. 97 N.J. Super. 75, 234 A.2d 415 (1967).
28. See also Katz v. Slade, 460 S.W.2d 608 (Mo. 1970).
29. 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965).
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as a result of a brake failure on the truck and brought an action
against defendant-lessor. The plaintiff alleged breach of an implied
warranty and negligence in maintenance of the truck as against the
defendant. The trial court dismissed the warranty claim and plain-
tiff appealed, contending that the trial court erred in so doing. The
supreme court reversed, holding that the leasing agreement gave
rise to a continuing implied promissory warranty that the leased
trucks would be fit for plaintiff's employer's use for the duration
of the lease (independent of any undertaking by the lessor to serv-
ice and maintain the trucks throughout the lease period) and that
the nature of the U-drive-it business is such that the responsibility
to Hertz (defendant) might properly be stated in strict liability
terms.
The specific holding of the court on the issue of strict liability
was couched in the following words:
A bailor for hire, such as a person in the U-drive-it business, puts
motor vehicles in the stream of commerce in a fashion not unlike
a manufacturer or retailer. . . . The very nature of the business
is such that the bailee, his employees, passengers and the travel-
ing public are exposed to a greater quantum of potential danger
of harm from defective vehicles than usually arises out of sales
by the manufacturer. . . . By analogy [the rule of strict liability
in tort] should be made applicable to the U-drive-it bailor-bailee
relationship."
The significance of the decision was two-fold. For the first time,
judicial recognition was afforded to the proposition that no viable
distinction could be drawn between the commercial function of the
manufacturer and the mass lessor of automobiles. Secondly, judi-
cial sanction was conferred upon the identification of a new stan-
dard for determining the propriety of applying strict liability.
Heretofore, it was thought necessary to establish the existence of
a technical sale of the allegedly defective product. The decision
subordinated this consideration to the higher priority of finding
conduct on the part of a supplier of products amounting to product
distribution through the steam of commerce.
In support of its decision, the court cited an earlier federal
court decision on the strict liability of the manufacturer to the
consumer. In Delaney v. Towmotor Corp.,31 decided by the Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals in 1964, the manufacturer-bailor of
a fork-lift truck was held to strict liability in tort for injuries sus-
30. Id., at 444-45, 212 A.2d 777-78.
31. 339 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1964).
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tained by an employee of the bailee while operating the fork-lift.
Speaking for the court, Judge Friendly discounted any necessity of
finding a sale of the defective product as a condition to the imposi-
tion of strict liability so long as it could be established that the
product was "placed in the stream of commerce by other means"
through the responsibility of the party-defendant.32 Significantly,
the court interpreted the traditional limitation of liability to sales
transactions as merely "descriptive of the situation that has most
commonly arisen," and expressly rejected the suggestion that such
classification was intended as a designation of exclusive
limitation. 33
The decision in Cintrone sounded the clarion call for the assault
on the bastion of strict liability. Numerous courts were quickly
confronted with the necessity for resolving the liability of the com-
mercial lessor in terms of strict liability in tort. The next decision
emerged from California. In McClaflin v. Bayshore Equipment
Rental Co., 34 the California Court of Appeals ruled that lessors
of personal property, engaged in the business of distributing goods
to the public and functioning as an integral part of the overall
marketing enterprise connected with such goods, could be held
strictly liable in tort. The court reasoned that no distinction could
be drawn between the ultimate function served by the commercial
lessor in the distributive scheme of a given product and that served
by a manufacturer or retailer. In either case, the marketing enter-
prise was advanced and a conduit established for the large-scale
transfer of products from the producer to the consumer. In further
justification of its decision, the court argued that:
In some cases the lessor may be the only member of the enter-
prise reasonably available to the injured plaintiff and the imposi-
tion of strict liability upon him serves, as in the case of the
retailer, as an incentive to safety. This will afford maximum
protection to the injured plaintiff while working no injustice upon
the lessor: the latter can recover the cost of the protection by
charging for it in his business.35
32. Id. at 6.
33. Id. at 6. The Cintrone court also relied on Booth Steamship Co. v. Meier & Oelhaf
Co., 262 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1958), wherein the court indicated that the liability of suppliers
of equipment under the implied warranty theory should be co-extensive with the liability
imposed on sellers of the same equipment, and Gambino v. John Lucas & Co., 263 App.
Div. 1054, 34 N.Y.S.2d 383 (1942), which involved a finding that a lessor of a piece of
machinery could be held liable for breach of an implied warranty that the machine was safe
and suitable for the use intended.
34. 274 Cal. App. 2d 446, 79 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1969).
35. Id. at _ 79 Cal. Rptr. at 340.
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In short succession, courts in Illinois,36 Hawaii,37 Alaska 3 and
New Mexico3 9 adopted the reasoning of the Cintrone and
McClaflin decisions and imposed strict liability on commercial
lessors for injuries resulting from the lease of defective goods. In
Gallucio v. Hertz Corporation," the Appellate Court of Illinois
sustained a jury verdict for the plaintiff in a case arising out of an
accident involving brake failure on a rental van. Defendant-lessor
argued that the complaint, as amended, sounding in strict liability,
failed to state a cause of action and that the liability of a commer-
cial lessor for injuries resulting from the lease of defective goods
rested solely on negligence principles appurtenant to the law of
bailment. In rejecting the defendant-lessor's argument, the court
declared that strict liability of a commercial lessor rested on the
basis that such lessor functioned to place motor vehicles in the
stream of commerce in a fashion not unlike the manufacturer or
retailer.
The Hawaii Supreme Court followed suit in extending the pro-
tection of strict liability in Stewart v. Budge Rent-A-Car Corp."
The case involved an action by the driver of a leased auto against
an automobile rental agency for injuries sustained when the auto-
mobile left the road and overturned. The court considered the
arguments supporting the rule of strict products liability and deter-
mined that, in reason and justice, the public interest in human life
and safety required the maximum possible protection against dan-
gerous defects in products marketed by either manufacturers or
lessors. The court defined the class subject to the imposition of
strict products liability and explained the basis for such definition
in the following language:
• . . by placing the goods on the market the maker and those in
the chain of distribution represent to the public that the products
are suitable and safe for use and that the burden of accidental
injuries caused by defective chattels should be placed upon those
in the chain of distribution as a cost of doing business and as an
incentive to guard against such defects .... 12
In Bachner v. Pearson4 3 the Alaska Supreme Court held strict
36. Gallucio v. Hertz Corp., 1 111. App. 3d 272, 274 N.E.2d 178 (1971).
37. Stewart v. Budge Rent-A-Car, 52 Hawaii 71, 470 P.2d 240 (1970).
38. Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319 (Alaska 1970).
39. Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732 (1972).
40. 1 111. App. 3d 272, 274 N.E.2d 178 (1971).
41. 52 Hawaii 71, 470 P.2d 240 (1970).
42. Id. at _ 470 P.2d 243.
43. 479 P.2d 319 (Alaska 1970).
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liability applicable to commercial lease transactions in Alaska.
The court reasoned that the existence of a lease instead of a sale
would not preclude a plaintiff from recovering under a theory of
implied warranty, and therefore should not preclude recovery
under strict liability in tort. The court declared any distinction
between sales and leases inconsequential in situations where the
lessor functions in the same capacity as the retailer and manufac-
turer in distributing products through the stream of commerce.
Echoing the logic of those courts which had previously confronted
the issue, the court rationalized its decision by remarking that:
. . . the lessor will in most instances be in a better position than
the consumer to prevent the circulation of defective products and
. . . like the retailer and the manufacturer, will generally be able
to spread damages and insure against the risk of injuries stem-
ming from the use of defective products which he has placed on
the market.4
The New Mexico Supreme Court recently entertained a case
presenting the question of whether strict liability or the negligence
liability of Secs. 407 and 408 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
should govern the commercial lease transaction, and arrived at
much the same conclusion that previous courts had reached.45 The
court rejected in no uncertain terms the suggestion that strict liabil-
ity was to be confined to sales transactions and was not intended
to supplement the liability of lessors under the aforementioned
sections of the Restatement. The court then proceeded to itemize
and examine the policy considerations inherent in the decision to
impose strict liability on sellers of defective products, for the pur-
pose of ascertaining whether the same considerations had some
relevant bearing on lessors of defective products. The court con-
cluded that the nature of the transaction by which the consumer
obtained possession of the defective product was extraneous to the
true purpose of strict liability and that the public interest in afford-
ing injured consumers an adequate remedy to obtain recompense
was every bit as well served by imposing strict liability on dealers
in the business of leasing as it was by imposing strict liability on
sellers in the business of selling. In either instance, the imposition
of strict liability promotes the policy of spreading the risk of loss
from injuries resulting from the use of defective products through-
out society.
44. Id. at 326-27.
45. Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732 (1972).
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The most recent case involving lessor strict liability arose in
Oregon. In Summers v. Interstate Tractor and Equipment Co.,4"
plaintiff sought recovery for the wrongful death of her husband
against the owner and lessor of the truck which decedent was
driving when he was killed. Plaintiff alleged that decedent's death
was caused by a defective steering mechanism in the truck which
was present at the time the vehicle was leased by defendant to
decedent's employer. Without discussion, the court held that plain-
tiff had stated a good cause of action in strict liability against
defendant-lessor. Although Oregon had never confronted the issue
of lessor strict liability, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals inter-
preted Oregon products liability case law to afford protection to
injured consumers regardless of whether the product causing injury
entered the stream of commerce through a sales or a lease
transaction.4 7
Although the aforementioned cases are virtually unanimous in
their support of extending strict liability beyond the bounds of the
technical sales transaction, there is a singular point of distinction
in the cases which deserves comment.
In Lechuga, Inc. v. Montgomery," the Arizona Court of Ap-
peals entertained the question of the applicability of strict liability
to commercial lessors and suggested a point of departure from the
46. 466 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1972).
47. At this juncture, it seems expedient to opt for a more abbreviated discussion of the
cases supporting the rule of lessor strict liability. To this end, let the following list and the
parenthetical remarks contained therein suffice: Fakhoury v. Magner, 25 Cal. App. 3d 58,
101 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1972) (imposing strict liability on the lessor of certain personal property
furnished concomitantly with an apartment which formed the subject of another lease
involving the same lessor for injuries resulting from use by the lessee of the personal
property under circumstances indicating that the lease of the personal property was not an
isolated or casual transaction and that the lessor was engaged in the business of placing such
personal property in the stream of commerce); Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 345, 85
Cal. Rptr. 178, 466 P. 2d 722 (1970) (imposing strict liability on an oil company which
leased a defective truck for injuries sustained by an employee of the lessee of the truck under
circumstances which established the commercial character of the lease transaction and the
lessor, party thereto); Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 71 Cal. Rptr
306 (1966) (imposing strict liability on a wholesale-retail distributor who merely distributed
tires from stock on order of the manufacturer on the theory that, while occupying the status
of a non-seller, he was nonetheless actively engaged in placing products within the stream
of commerce); Perfection Paint and Color Co. v. Konduris, 258 N.E.2d 681 (App. Ct. Ind.
1970) (imposing strict liability on the gratuitous supplier of lacquer reducer for the death
of a distributee caused by a fire resulting from the ignition of the lacquer reducer on the
premise that the application of strict liability was not limited to sales transactions but
extended to transactions suggestive of the commercial character of the supplier of a defec-
tive product and the commercial nature of the role filled by the supplier in placing articles
in the stream of commerce).
48. 12 Ariz. App. 32, 467 P.2d 256 (1970).
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position taken by those courts which had previously considered the
issue.
The court refused to answer the question on the basis of a
finding that plaintiff-lessee had not met his burden of proof on the
question of whether the defect complained of was present when the
leased vehicle was placed in the stream of commerce by defendant-
lessor. In a concurring opinion, Judge Jackson suggested that strict
liability would apply to the commercial lessor of chattels but only
on the condition that plaintiff could establish the existence of the
defect as of the time the chattel left the hands of the manufacturer,
thus characterizing the defect complained of as one occurring in
the manufacturing process and bringing the case within the ambit
of the express purpose of strict liability.49 The effect of such condi-
tional application of strict liability is to significantly restrict the
availability of the remedy and to seriously increase the burden of
proof devolving upon those who attempt to make use of it. Since
the time of this decision, another court has opted to condition the
application of strict liability in a similar fashion."
It should be noted that not every case has applied strict liability
to the commercial lessor alleged to have marketed a defective
product, but these few cases are distinguishable and offer little
support for the proposition that strict- liability under Sec. 402A
should be restricted to sellers of products, narrowly defined. The
case most often cited for this proposition is Speyer, Inc. v. Humble
Oil and Refining Co., 51 decided by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals in 1968, and discussed in some detail earlier. The defen-
dant in this case had ordered a new flexsteel hose installed on a
gasoline pump which it owned and leased to the plaintiff for use
in the plaintiff's business under a lease-back arrangement with the
plaintiff. The plaintiff's employees caused certain damage to the
flexsteel hose and as a result a leakage of gasoline from the pump
occurred. The spilled gasoline erupted into flames which, in turn,
caused considerable damage to the building and property of the
plaintiff. The plaintiff sought to recover against the defendant on
the theory that since the defendant had leased the defective prod-
uct, it was liable under strict liability principles for causing such
product to enter the stream of commerce. The court of appeals
ruled that:
49. Id. at _ 467 P.2d at 262.
50. Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 731, 497 P.2d 732 (1972).
51. 403 F.2d 766 (3d Cir. 1968).
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If Humble is not a seller, then no responsibility may attach under
the doctrine of strict liability.52
The court held that Humble incurred no liability to the plaintiff
under the theory of strict liability because it was not a seller of gas
pumps regularly and customarily engaged in the business of selling
gas pumps. While it is possible to urge the case in support of a
restrictive interpretation of the term "seller" for purposes of deter-
mining the scope of the class exposed to liability under Sec. 402A,
it is more accurate and eminently more reasonable to regard the
decision as predicated upon the finding that Humble Oil was not
in the business of selling or leasing gasoline pumps and had as-
sumed the responsibility of furnishing this particular pump as a
one-time, only-time concession to a prospective customer in order
to obtain a service contract.
The same distinction might be made in the case of Freitas v.
Twin City Fisherman's Cooperative Association5 3 which is also
cited in support of a restrictive interpretation of the term "seller."
In Freitas, a truck driver brought an action, seeking recovery for
personal injuries sustained in a fall from a platform leading to the
top of an oil tank which he was filling, against the oil company
which owned the tank and a shrimp boat service cooperative to
whom the tank had been leased for storage of the oil company's
products. Plaintiff alleged that the platform and ladder were defec-
tive in that they were not anchored to the tank, either at the ground
or to any fixed object as such ladders customarily are. The plat-
form, from which the driver fell, had been designed, made and
installed by an independent contractor employed by the oil com-
pany, at the direction of the oil company in fulfillment of a con-
tract for the lease of an oil storage tank from the oil company to
the cooperative.
On appeal from a judgment for defendants, plaintiff-truck
driver asserted that the trial court had erred in refusing to enter
judgment against defendants on the theory of strict liability. After
viewing the evidence and finding that the oil company was not in
the business of selling tanks, ladders, or platforms, the Texas Civil
Court of Appeals ruled that plaintiff had failed to state a case for
the application of strict liability. While some have urged the case
in support of the proposition that strict liability should be limited
to technical sales transactions, a closer reading reveals the opposite
to be true.
52. Id. at 772.
53. 452 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
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The court did not condition the application of strict liability on
proof of a sale of the allegedly defective product. As a matter of
fact, the court specifically admitted that where it could be estab-
lished that the transaction by which the product is transmitted into
the stream of commerce is essentially commercial in character,
liability could arise under Section 402A.14 In the final analysis, the
most that can be said of the decision is that it forbids the applica-
tion of strict liability to those persons who merely construct items
intended to facilitate the use of other products made the subject
of a isolated lease.55
Just recently, however, a decision was rendered by the Mary-
land Court of Appeals which makes the aforementioned distinc-
tions somewhat less persuasive. In Bona v. Graefe,56 a patron of a
Maryland golf club sought recovery for injuries sustained in a golf
cart spill. The plaintiff had rented the cart from the club profes-
sional who was in charge of maintaining the carts and owned the
concession thereto. Plaintiff instituted an action against the distrib-
utor of the cart and the club professional-manager-lessor of the
cart, alleging negligence, breach of warranty and strict liability.
The trial court directed a verdict in favor of the defendants. Plain-
tiff appealed, arguing that the trial judge had erred in directing
verdicts for the defendants on the theories of breach of warranty
and strict liability. The court of appeals affirmed. In holding for
defendant-lessor the court adopted a restrictive interpretation of
the scope of liability to which a lessor is exposed. The court limited
the applicability of liability predicated upon breach of implied
warranty or breach of the duty prescribed by Sec. 402A to "sell-
ers" of products and restricted the liability of lessors of products
to negligence. The court cited Speyer v. Humble Oil and Refining
Co. for the proposition that Sec. 402A was directed solely at the
seller of a defective product and thus could not be applied in a case
involving a lease. The case is of limited precedential value, how-
ever, for Maryland has not yet adopted Sec. 402A.11
In summary, then, it might be said that the courts have demon-
strated a decided reluctance to distinguish between sellers of prod-
ucts and non-sellers or products, such as bailors and lessors, for
purposes of strict liability, when it can be established that, in either
instance, products are placed on the market for distribution to the
use of consumers with the knowledge that such products will in all
54. Id. at 937-38.
55. Id. at 937.
56. 264 Md. 69, 285 A.2d 607 (1972).
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probability be used without inspection for defects. So long as it can
be determined (1) that the lessor of products is engaged in the
business of lending; (2) that he is actively functioning as an integral
part of the marketing enterprise or distributive scheme established
for a product; (3) that he has leased a defective product, unreasona-
bly dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property which
caused injury to the user or consumer or to his property and (4)
that the product leased was expected to and did reach the user or
consumer without substantial change in its condition after lease,
then it can be expected that strict liability will be imposed on the
lessor. The purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of
injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manu-
facturers that put such products on the market through the conduit
of the commercial links in the distributive scheme rather than by
the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves. Keep-
ing in mind the market realities and the widespread use of the lease
of personalty in today's business world, it seems quite reasonable
to impose on the lessors of chattels the same liability for physical
harm which has been imposed on manufacturers and retailers.
Strict liability works no injustice to either class. Lessors, as well
as manufacturers and retailers, are quite competent to adjust the
costs accruing through imposition of strict liability by spreading
the loss to the consuming public. As between themselves, they may
adjust the costs of protection against strict liability in the course
of their continuing business relationship. 8
With respect to the potential for strict liability exposure of
lessors in the years to come, it should be noted that institutional
lenders such as banks, savings and loan associations, and insurance
companies are presently entering the lease business by writing
leases of expensive construction equipment and industrial machi-
nery for individuals unable or unwilling to expend money to pur-
chase such items.59 Although it might be argued that such institu-
tional lenders are actually doing no more than financing the pur-
chase of such items (since most of these "leases" contain an option
to purchase at the end of the lease period, exercisable by payment
of some nominal value), and thus, are not really functioning as
57. Myers v. Montgomery Ward and Co., 253 Md. 282, 252 A.2d 855 (1969); Telak v.
Maszcenski, 248 Md. 476, 237 A.2d 434 (1968).
58. For a listing of cases considering lessor strict liability, see FRUmER AND FRIEDMAN,
PRODucTs LIABILITY § 16A [4] [3] [iiil; See also Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 1057 (1972).
59. See Hawkland, The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on Equipment
Leasing, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 446 (1972).
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commercial lessors, such as to warrant imposition of strict liabil-
ity, the ultimate resolution of the question might well hinge on
whether it can be said that such institutional lenders constitute an
integral link in the marketing enterprise or distributive scheme
relative to a given product. Although it is highly improbable that
a particular lending institution would become so involved in writ-
ing these hybrid lease-finance agreements that it could be termed
an institutional lessor of chattels in the traditional sense, it is quite
likely that they could become sufficiently involved to consider the
venture something more than a purely incidental aspect of their
business. That being the case, might it not be said that the lender
involved was in the business of negotiating such arrangements and
in so doing functioning as an integral link in the marketing enter-
prise by which products flowed into the stream of commerce?
LICENSOR LIABILITY UNDER SEC. 402A
The final consideration of this paper involves the question of
the liability of a licensor of a product for injuries resulting from
the use of such product caused by a defect in the product. In this
connection, it is important to distinguish between the type of licen-
sor who confers a privilege on the consumer to use a product and
in such fashion projects a particular product into the stream of
commerce and the type of licensor who enters into a franchising
or trademark licensing agreement with another manufacturer
wherein a franchise or license is conferred upon that other manu-
facturer by the franchise donor or trademark owner to produce and
market a product protected by the franchise or trademark and in
this fashion projects a product into the stream of commerce. The
former situation will be discussed first.
The most prominent case involving the strict liability of a licen-
sor for injuries sustained by a licensee in making use of a defective
product arose in California in 1970. In Garcia v. Halsett," an 11-
year-old boy sought recovery for injuries sustained when his arm
became entangled in a washing machine at defendant's launderette.
The boy had reached into the machine in order to retrieve some
clothes at a time when the machine was not in motion and as he
was in the process of pulling the clothes out, the machine suddenly
and unexpectedly started up. Plaintiff established the defective
character of the machine by expert testimony to the effect that (1)
the timing mechanism (which regulated the cycle of the machine)
60. 3 Cal. App. 3d 319, 82 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1970).
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had gone awry (in that it failed to prevent the machine from stop-
ping mid-cycle and starting again when jostled), and (2) that the
machine was not equipped with a micro switch which functioned
to close off all circuits when the door was open even though such
devices were available as of the time and place of manufacture.
Plaintiff sought to submit the case on the theory of strict liability
but the trial judge refused to so instruct. Plaintiff appealed, con-
tending that the refusal to instruct on strict liability was error. The
California Court of Appeals agreed and reversed. The court held
that although defendant was only a licensor of the product in ques-
tion, nonetheless:
Licensors of personal property, like the manufacturers or retail-
ers or lessors thereof "are an integral part of the overall market-
ing enterprise that should bear the cost of injuries resulting from
defective products." (Quoting from McCalflin v. Bayshore
Equipment Rental Co.)."
In rationalizing its decision, the court observed that, although
the licensor is not engaged in the distribution of the product, in the
same manner as a manufacturer, retailer or lessor, the licensor
does provide the product to the public for use by the public and
does play more than an ancillary role in the overall marketing
enterprise of the product in question, thus coming within the ra-
tionale of strict products liability. The court's reasoning suggests
that the precise legal relationship between the parties is of slight
significance in determining the applicability of strict liability so
long as it can be said that the rationale of strict liability applies to
the transaction in question.
Several other jurisdictions have directly confronted the issue
of strict liability for the licensor but have reached the opposite
conclusion. In Wagner v. Coronet Hotel,62 a paying guest at a hotel
sought to recover for personal injuries allegedly sustained when he
slipped on a bath mat while taking a shower as a result of the
defective condition of the mat. The plaintiff named both the hotel
and the manufacturer of the bath mat as defendants in an action
predicated on strict liability. The jury returned a verdict for the
plaintiff, but the trial judge granted defendants' motion for judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict. The plaintiff appealed and the
Arizona Court of Appeals reversed as to the manufacturer. In
discussing the question of whether the hotel might be held liable
61. Id. at _ 82 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
62. 10 Ariz. App. 296, 458 P.2d 390 (1969).
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on the theory of strict liability in tort, the court observed that none
of the justifications for the imposition of strict liability extended
so far as to encompass the liability of a hotel to its paying guest.
The same result was reached in Katz v. Slade,63 involving an
action in strict liability to recover against the owner-licensor of a
golf cart for injuries sustained by a bystander when struck by the
golf cart as it careened out of the control of the licensee. The court
rejected plaintiff's claim that defendant-licensor could be held
strictly liable in tort and offered the soothing balm of potential
negligence liability as a substitute theory. The case is particularly
significant, however, for its reasoning. Although the court did not
find liability on the part of the licensor in this instance, the court's
analysis suggests that it would be inclined to do so in the future
under the proper circumstances. When it can be established that a
given licensor's operation was essentially commercial in character,
functioned as an integral link in the over-all marketing enterprise
connected with the product made the subject of the license and
constituted a commercial distribution by a profit-making concern
to a public forced to depend upon the representation that the prod-
uct was suitable and safe to use, the court indicates that strict
liability against the licensor will lie. 4 The effect of the decision is
to add support to the rule enunicated by the California Court of
Appeals in Garcia v. Halsett.15
With respect to this aspect of licensor strict liability, it must
be conceded that the issue is still in doubt. Most cases arising out
of the licensor-licensee relationship will probably be tried under a
negligence theory. Some will be tried under the negligence princi-
ples appurtenant to the common-law entrant classification scheme
for the disposition of premises liability cases. Some potential licen-
sor liability cases will go by the boards on plaintiff's option to
travel the strict liability route against the manufacturer, or the
wholesaler, or the retailer. However, it can be expected that a
certain few cases will arise under the theory of strict liability of the
licensor. As yet, it is not clear how the courts will handle the issue.
If the court is concerned that the licensor is functioning as an
integral part of the overall marketing enterprise connected with a
given product and does not simply play an ancillary role in the
distributive scheme, the court is likely to hold the licensor liable
under strict liability, assuming of course that similar liberality has
63. 460 S.W.2d 608 (Mo. 1970).
64. Id. at 613.
65. 3 Cal. App. 3d 319, 82 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1970).
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been demonstrated by the court in treating of strict liability cases
involving lessors. Conversely, if the court is primarily concerned
with differentiating between the various manners of distribution of
the product and according controlling significance thereto, the de-
cision is likely to reflect a policy determination that liability should
not extend that far down in the chain of distribution. Although it
seems incongruous to speak of the licensor as transmitting prod-
ucts into the stream of commerce, when, most typically, those
products will not even leave the possession of the licensor, this test
will apparently govern the determination of the licensor's liability.
However, for a more informed judgment as to the likelihood of a
finding of licensor strict liability in any given jurisdiction, reference
should be made to the standard prevailing in that jurisdiction by
which the liability of commercial lessors is measured.
The second aspect of licensor strict liability is concerned with
the trademark licensor-licensee relationship. Whereas the cases
previously considered have all been concerned with the propriety
of applying strict liability in tort downward through the various
links in the marketing chain from manufacturer to distributor, to
wholesaler, to retailer, to lessor and finally to licensor, the question
of whether strict liability should apply to the trademark licensor,
who contracts with another manufacturer for the purpose of con-
ferring on that manufacturer a license to produce the product pro-
tected by the trademark, is primarily one of determining the pro-
priety of extending strict liability, predicated on enterprise involve-
ment, upwards from the manufacturer.
The issue, to date, has only been confronted by a single court.
Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., Inc.6" involved an appeal from a
judgment on a jury verdict for defendant, Remington Arms Co.,
Inc., in an action for personal injury damages arising out of the
explosion of an allegedly defective 12-gauge shotgun shell. Plaintiff
established that the shell which caused him injury had been manu-
factured in Mexico by a company called Cartuchas Deportivas De
Mexico, S.A. (hereinafter referred to as CDM). The evidence also
established that Remington had caused CDM to be created and
that CDM was affiliated with Remington through Remington's
ownership of 40 percent of the outstanding common stock of CDM
and the existence of interlocking directorates and common officers.
In 1961, Remington entered into a Trademark Licensing
Agreement with CDM, granting CDM a 20-year nonexclusive,
66. 24 Cal. App. 3d 711, 101 Cal. Rptr. 314 (1972).
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non-transferable license to use Remington's registered trademarks
on ammunition manufactured by CDM. Remington retained a
right to inspect and control the quality of all ammunition on which
its trademarks were used.
After a jury verdict in favor of Remington, plaintiff moved for
a new trial, asserting error by the trial court in its refusal to give
the jury any of plaintiff's requested special instructions and partic-
ularly in its instruction that Remington's liability was contingent
on a finding that it was the actual manufacturer of the defective
shell or on a finding that CDM was acting as the agent of Reming-
ton in the manufacturing business. Plaintiff appealed from a judg-
ment on the verdict in favor of defendant, following denial of the
motion. The California Appellate Court reversed.
The court held that evidence of either actual manufacture by
Remington or an agency relationship between CDM and Reming-
ton was unnecessary and irrelevant to a finding of strict liability
against Remington. The court also held that the evidence adduced
of Remington's involvement in the enterprise was sufficient to re-
quire the trial court as a matter of law to find that Remington was
an integral part of the business enterprise which placed the defec-
tive shell in the stream of commerce and thus, if the usual condi-
tions could be met, strictly liable in tort. As the determinative
factor in the decision to impose strict liability, the court reiterated
the test which had been utilized in measuring the liability exposure
of other links in the marketing enterprise:
It is the defendant's participatory connection, for his personal
profit or other benefit, with the injury-producing product and
with the enterprise that created consumer demand for and reli-
ance upon the product and not the defendant's legal relationship,
such as agency, with the manufacturer. . . which calls for impo-
sition of strict liability.17
Under the facts in the Remington case, the court did no more
than demonstrate a remarkable consistency in its treatment of
those entities involved in the manufacturing-marketing system.
Had the court permitted Remington to stay without the scope of
strict liability, it would have been faced with the reality of holding
producers, manufacturers and others in the distributive scheme to
one standard of care with respect to the public and trademark
owners and franchisors, who license others to manufacture prod-
ucts and, typically, bestow upon such licensees and franchisees the
67. Id. at _ 101 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
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knowledge required for production, to another standard. Given the
premise that the trademark constitutes a significant factor in con-
sumer product selection, insofar as it produces considerable con-
sumer reliance on the quality of the product, the imposition of
strict liability on the trademark licensor or franchisor seems per-
fectly consistent with the stated rationale for strict liability." In
any event, the extension of strict liability to apply to the trademark
licensor of a manufacturer, allegedly responsible for the produc-
tion of the defective product and an injury resulting to a consumer
subsequent thereto, may well signify the future direction of strict
liability.
Some indication of the significance attaching to this shift in
direction can be gleaned from an examination of several recent
cases, not directly related to the subject of this paper, but suffi-
ciently connected with it to merit inclusion. In the Remington case,
the court adverted to the decision in Hanberry v. Hearst Corp.,"
wherein the California Court of Appeals refused to apply strict
liability in tort to a product endorser. It was suggested in
Remington that Hanberry might well warrant reevaluation under
the determinative standards enunciated in Remington. The
Remington court allowed that where it could be established that a
product endorser by its avowed and well-publicized testing activity
operated as the responsible inducement for the purchase of a prod-
uct by a consumer, which product subsequently caused the con-
sumer injury through a manufacturing defect, the product endorser
would be held strictly liable on the enterprise involvement theory,
regardless of its lack of control over the manufacturing process.
Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., ° is equally surprising in its
application of strict liability upwards from the manufacturer in the
marketing enterprise. This case involved an action arising out of a
dynamite explosion, the cause of which was attributed to a defec-
tive fuse. Defendant-Hercules was a large dynamite manufacturer
who accepted an order from a jobber for a shipment of dynamite
and fuses. Hercules supplied the dynamite to the jobber (who in
turn delivered them to the customer) but delegated responsibility
for the production and delivery of the fuses to another manufac-
turer (who assumed responsibility for distribution of the fuses to
68. See also Comment, Tort Liability of Trademark Licensors, 55 IOWA L. REV. 693
(1969); Comment, A Franchisor's Liability for the Torts of His Franchisee, 5 U. SAN FRAN.
L. REV. 118 (1970).
69. 276 Cal. App. 2d 680, 81 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1969).
70. 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1965).
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the customers). Denying that Hercules had played no part in the
manufacture of the defective product the court ruled that Hercules
could not delegate responsibility for the fulfillment of an order
which it had accepted and cause the actual manufacturer to place
a defective product into the stream of commerce as a result thereof
and claim that strict liability did not attach. The court indicated
that strict liability will be applied to any manufacturing or market-
ing entity, whether upwards or downwards from the actual manu-
facturer in the distributive enterprise, whenever it can be found that
such entity functioned as an essential link in the scheme established
for placing a product in the stream of commerce. Canifax does not
state the limit, however, in enterprise involvement, strict liability
litigation. A more recent case reaches even further upwards from
the manufacturer in an effort to posit strict liability.
In Hall v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours and Co.,7 thirteen children
sued six manufacturers of blasting caps and their trade association
in a products liability action brought under federal diversity juris-
diction. The plaintiffs were allegedly injured by blasting caps in
twelve unrelated accidents occurring in ten different states between
1955 and 1959. Because of the inability of most of the plaintiffs to
identify the specific manufacturer whose product caused the injury
complained of, plaintiffs sought to hold the entire group of manu-
facturers and their trade associations, comprising virtually the en-
tire blasting cap industry of the United States, jointly liable for
injuries caused by their product. Plaintiffs alleged that the long-
standing industry practice of not placing a warning message on
individual blasting caps and failing to manufacture caps which
would have been less easily detonated was the result of a conscious
agreement among the defendants, reached in the light of known
dangers, and constituted grounds for imposing industry-wide negli-
gence and strict tort liability. The court agreed with plaintiffs'
central contention, stating that "there are circumstances, illus-
trated by this litigation, in which an entire industry can be held
liable for harm caused by their product," but declined to resolve
the issue in favor of these particular plaintiffs.
As to the five plaintiffs who were able to identify the particular
offending manufacturer, the court held that the arbitrary basis of
plaintiffs' selection of the non-producer defendants, and the ab-
sence of any demonstrable need for joint liability in administrative
or remedial terms, compelled the dismissal of each plaintiff's
71. 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. N.Y. 1972).
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claims against the non-producer defendants. The court ordered the
action against the alleged offending manufacturers to be tried in
the federal districts of the place of injury. As to the eight plaintiffs
who were unable to identify the particular manufacturers of the
injury-causing caps, the court held that plaintiffs' allegations of
joint knowledge and action raised sufficient issues of fact todefeat
dismissal and dictated a finding that the case be ordered brought
on for trial.
The significance of the decision lies in this last finding. Whether
the plaintiffs are successful in establishing industry-wide strict lia-
bility at trial remains to be seen, but the precedent has been set.
Heretofore, no court had ever considered holding an entire indus-
try strictly liable. The DuPont court not only considered the possi-
bility but admitted the viability of such a decision. Beyond any
doubt, new vistas in strict liability have been opened up. In suggest-
ing that non-offending manufacturers and an industry trade asso-
ciation might be held responsible in strict liability for injuries
caused by certain trade practices, the court has added an extra
dimension to the enterprise involvement theory.
It is quite obvious that we have come some distance from the
rather conservative expression of the proper scope of strict liability
contained in Sec. 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
There is no way of knowing whether the trend toward an expanded,
almost all-inclusive strict liability will continue. It is fairly certain
that commercial lessors can expect to be subject to the imposition
of strict liability. It is also quite conceivable that licensors of prod-
ucts Who grant the public a license or a privilege to use certain
products will be subjected to the imposition of strict liability to the
same extent as have been lessors of products. However, the case
law on this point is still rather inconclusive. As for the potential
strict liability exposure of other entities in the marketing enter-
prise, the most that can be said is that the possibility exists.
Whether the somewhat less impulsive jurisdictions in the country
choose to follow the lead of California in tracing liability for inju-
ries resulting from defective products upwards from the manufac-
turer to the trademark licensor, to the product certifier and endor-
ser and, indeed, to the institutional lender providing the necessary
capital to fuel the marketing effort, remains to be determined. The
recent California cases harbinging liability for defective products
upwards through the manufacturing enterprise might well prove to
be aberrations. On the other hand, they might well prove to be the
precursors of another assault on another citadel in the field of
products liability.
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THE LAW IN WISCONSIN
The question of lessor-licensor strict liability has not yet been
presented to the Wisconsin Supreme Court for determination and
a definite answer as to the status of the law in Wisconsin is there-
fore impossible. However, some indication of what the position of
the Wisconsin Supreme Court is likely to be can be gleaned from
an analysis of the court's opinion in Dippel v. Sciano.71 The case
involved an action to recover for personal injuries sustained when
the front-leg assembly of a large coin-operated pool table col-
lapsed, crushing plaintiff-Dippel's foot. The accident happened on
January 1, 1964, in a tavern operated by defendants, Tony and
Dottie Sciano. Plaintiff alleged that the table was being moved to
a position where it could be used at the request and with the
consent of the tavernkeeper's employee. Plaintiff brought the ac-
tion against (1) Fisher Manufacturing Company, the manufacturer
of the coin-operated table, (2) Pioneer Sales and Service, Inc., the
sales distributor for the manufacturer, (3) Carl J. Dentice, d/b/a
City-Wide Amusement Company, the owner and lessor of the
coin-operated table, and (4) Tony and Dottie Sciano d/b/a Tony
and Dottie's Tavern, the lessee of the table.
Plaintiff alleged negligence against all defendants and breach
of express and implied warranties as against the manufacturer and
the sales distributor. The sales distributor, Pioneer, demurred to
the cause of action for breach of express and implied warranties
on the grounds that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action. The trial court sustained the demurrer
for the reason that there was no privity of contract between
plaintiff-user and defendant-seller. Plaintiff appealed, contending
that no just reason existed for treating lack of privity between user
and seller as a bar to an action for breach of implied warranty.
The court first determined that products liability cases of the
kind herein involved should be considered as a matter of strict
liability in tort rather than as matters of implied warranty exclu-
sively.73 The court next determined that the lack of privity of
contract between the seller of a defective product and its ultimate
consumer was immaterial to the injured consumer's claim of strict
liability in tort against the seller.74 In reaching this second conclu-
sion, the court relied upon the following policy considerations justi-
fying the abolition of the privity requirement in strict liability ac-
tions.
72. 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
73. Id. at 458-59, 155 N.W.2d at 63.
74. Id.
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. . . the seller is in the paramount position to distribute the costs
of the risks created by the defective product he is selling. He may
pass the cost on to the consumer via increased prices. He may
protect himself either by purchasing insurance or by a form of
self-insurance. In justification of making the seller pay for the
risk, it is argued that the consumer or user has the right to rely
on the apparent safety of the product and that it is the seller in
the first instance who creates the risk by placing the defective
product on the market. A correlative consideration, where the
manufacturer is concerned, is that the manufacturer has the
greatest ability to control the risk created by his product since
he may initiate or adopt inspection and quality control measures
thereby preventing defective products from reaching the con-
sumer.
75
Although, in this instance, the court was concerned with the
propriety of imposing strict liability on the manufacturer or dis-
tributor of defective products, it is immediately apparent that these
same policy considerations can be used to justify the application
of strict liability to the commercial lessor or licensor. Since the
disposition of a strict liability case ultimately turns on the court's
appreciation of the operative policy considerations, it seems quite
reasonable to conclude that the Wisconsin justification for strict
liability is sufficiently broad to encompass the commercial lessor
or licensor. Certainly, the commercial lessor or licensor is in a
better position to spread the costs of the risks created by the defec-
tive product than is the consumer. Similarly, the commercial lessor
or licensor has a much greater opportunity to insure himself
against the risk of loss than does the consumer. Furthermore, it is
not unreasonable to maintain that the consumer has a right to rely
on the apparent safety of the product marketed by the commercial
lessor or licensor, given the market realities of today's world. Fi-
nally, it must be conceded that the commercial lessor or licensor
has a much greater ability to control the risk created by the prod-
ucts he markets than does the consumer, not only because of the
inspection procedures which he is capable of initiating, but also
because of the pressure which he can bring to bear on the
manufacturer.
While it is somewhat hazardous to rely upon the Dippel case
as authority for the proposition that Wisconsin would apply strict
liability to the commercial lessor or licensor, since the question was
not considered therein, the policy considerations which were relied
75. Id. at 450-51, 155 N.W.2d at 58-59.
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upon to impose strict liability on the seller of a product certainly
apply with equal force to the lessor or licensor of products. The
ironic thing about the Dippel case is that it could have answered
this question had the plaintiff's strategy been different. If the plain-
tiff had pleaded a cause of action in strict liability against the City-
Wide Amusement Company, the owner and lessor of the allegedly
defective pool table, instead of an action in negligence, City-Wide
Amusement Company would undoubtedly have entered a demur-
rer along with the sales distributor. The case would then have gone
up to the Supreme Court on appeal from the order sustaining the
demurrers of the lessor and the sales distributor. The court would
therefore have been forced to decide the extent to which strict
liability could descend through the distributive chain.
If the Wisconsin court decides not to extend strict liability to
the commercial lessor or licensor, it will probably do so on the
authority of Carall v. Minneapolis Drive Your-self System," in
which a commercial lessor of automobiles was held bound by the
negligence standard of liability in the matter of leasing. The court
imposed a requirement that a lessor of automobiles exercise rea-
sonable diligence to discover the condition of his machines before
releasing them into the hands of drivers for use on the highways.
This might have seemed like an entirely reasonable standard of
liability in 1931 when the leasing business was in a fledgling stage
of development, but it is unacceptable today. Since that time, the
commercial leasing business has become a major force in the mar-
ketplace. There is no reason for holding lessors to a lower thresh-
old of liability than presently binds manufacturers and distributors.
In view of the intervention of Dippel, it is entirely possible that the
Wisconsin court will abandon the negligence standards presently
governing lessors in favor of strict liability as soon as the opportun-
ity presents itself. Whether the court will opt to extend strict liabil-
ity further in the distributive chain and give full expression to the
enterprise involvement test is another matter entirely. To forecast
the future direction of the Wisconsin court in this matter would be
baseless conjecture. Before mounting an assault on this most fore-
boding of citadels, however, the court would be well-advised to
distinguish between the carefully reasoned campaign and the fren-
zied religious crusade.
-WILLIAM A. WISEMAN
76. 206 Wis. 287, 239 N.W. 501 (1931).
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